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Abstract 
Despite the increasing understanding of the relationships between institutions and entrepreneurship, 
the influence of the quality of government institutions on entrepreneurship is less addressed. This 
paper focuses on this critical determinant of entrepreneurship in developing and developed 
countries. Drawing from institutional theory we hypothesize and empirically assess the role of the 
quality of institutions in entrepreneurial activity. We examine how the quality of government 
institutions influences the rate of necessity-based entrepreneurial activity across countries and over 
time by using a cross-sectional time-series approach on data from the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) database covering the years 2001–2011. Our results suggest that higher economic 
development associated with better quality of institutions reduces the prevalence of necessity-based 
entrepreneurship. Our findings imply that developing countries must rationally organize their 
functions, and seek to remove unnecessary barriers, decrease political instability, and controls that 
hamper entrepreneurial activity.  
Keywords:  Government Institutions, Quality, Regulation, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 
Entrepreneurial Motivation. 
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The Influence on Quality of Government Institutions on Entrepreneurial Motivation: 
Exploring the Variance across Countries 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between entrepreneurship and national economic development has shared a 
growing scholarly interest. This is accountable for the empirical results suggesting that the 
variations in economic growth rates can be explained by differing rates of entrepreneurship 
(Reynolds et al. 1999; Zacharakis at al. 2000). The embedded contribution of the new venture 
creation enables and fosters the national economic development and growth via activities such as 
introduction of new innovation, increasing the competition and market dynamics (Audretsch and 
Keilbach 2004; Wong et al. 2005). Interestingly, the influence of entrepreneurial efforts differs not 
only between countries at the similar level of development (Carree et al. 2002, 2007), but also 
between countries at different stages of development (Wennekers et al. 2005; Acs and Amorós 
2008) as well as among regions within a single country (Acs and Armington 2004; Belso-Martínez 
2005; Hall and Sobel 2008). Accordingly, entrepreneurship scholars are searching for the 
explanations why these differences exist. 
The empirical work documents various country level determinants of entrepreneurial engagement, 
such as level of educational attainment, business climate, and legal and political conditions (Grilo 
and Thurik 2005; Hwang and Powell 2005; van Stel et al. 2005; Grilo and Irigoyen 2006; Bowen 
and De Clercq 2008). Some of these ‘macro level’ factors can explain entrepreneurship rates but 
also types of entrepreneurial activities across countries and regions (Bowen and De Clercq 2008; 
Estrin et al., 2012; Stenholm et al. 2013). A number of researchers have developed frameworks to 
explain some of the macro (and micro) level determinants of entrepreneurial activities or process 
(Reynolds et al. 1999; Reynolds et al. 2005; Verheul et al. 2002; Wennekers and Thurik 1999; 
Sobel 2008). The majority of them conclude the same thing; institutional factors are an essential 
framework in understanding the determinants of entrepreneurial dynamics. 
As defined by North (1990, 97) the “institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction”. Based on this the institutions refer to a variety of social 
structures and rules that influence human and economic behavior. In addition to structure, such as 
division between formal and informal institutional determinans, their governance impacts the 
economic outcomes, including entrepreneurial activities, basically through the government’s 
general role to provide––or fail to provide––institutions that underpin the effective rule of law 
(Kaufmann et al. 1999; Kaufmann et al. 2008; Hellman et al. 2000). Thus, in addition to the 
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structure of the institutional arrangements, their quality––how well or badly the institutions are 
governed––is decisive for individuals and organizations to impose the ownership of their resources, 
gain access to new resources, and make decisions. Even if this seems as truism, the previous 
research illustrates that the variance in the quality of institutions generates different outcomes. 
Moreover, these differences are amplified between wealthy and poor countries (Acemoglu et al., 
2002; 2005; Amorós, 2009). Despite these insights on the quality of institutions, the influence of 
these differences on the different types of entrepreneurial behavior remains relatively understudied.  
Previous results suggest that the differences in regulative institutions––laws determining the 
behavior––enhance the variance in entrepreneurial behavior across countries (Wennekers et al. 
2005). As regulations and laws influence the level of access to resources required to create new 
businesses (Busenitz et al. 2000; Verheul et al. 2002), their quality is important for any type of 
entrepreneurial activity. In less developed countries, the regulation does not necessarily decrease the 
uncertainty related to human behavior or does not ease the access to resources needed in starting a 
business (Ardagna and Lusardi 2009). These variances indicate that in addition to the structure of 
institutions, their quality matters. However, the knowledge on the relationship between the quality 
of institutions and necessity--based entrepreneurship is still scarce. 
Our study investigates how the quality of institutions affects entrepreneurial activity across 
countries at different levels of economic development (cf. Acs and Amorós 2008; Bruton et al. 
2008; West et al. 2008). Instead of focusing on the rate of entrepreneurial activity in a country, we 
delimit our approach on necessity-based entrepreneurial activity. Necessity-based entrepreneurship 
comprises the engagement in entrepreneurial activity in case of no other appropriate choice of 
employment (Reynolds et al. 2005), while the opportunity-based entrepreneurship covers 
entrepreneurial activities started voluntarily in order to gain more income or independency (Bosma 
et al. 2008). Previous work illustrates that the general rate of nascent entrepreneurship varies across 
countries in relation to the level of economic development of each country (Wennekers et al. 2005). 
Closer insights suggest that necessity-based entrepreneurship may not have the same impact on 
economic development when compared to opportunity-based entrepreneurship (Acs 2006; Acs and 
Varga 2005). More importantly, the results show that the effect of institutional environment on 
entrepreneurial activity varies between necessity- and opportunity-based entrepreneurship (van Stel 
et al. 2007). This far, however, only a few studies have inquired about the link between institutional 
quality and entrepreneurship (Sobel 2008). 
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In this study we focus on the following questions: What kind of quality of institutions is related to 
the necessity--based entrepreneurship in different countries, and how do these relationships differ in 
developing and developed countries? The latter is highly important since thus far the majority of the 
scholarly work is discussing the developed country experiences and the developing countries’ 
aspect is relatively necklegted.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present a general framework on the concept 
of the quality of institutions and describe how it affects entrepreneurship; the following section 
describes data and explains our methodology. Next, we present a brief discussion of empirical 
results on the relationship between entrepreneurship and the quality of institutions. The last section 
concludes the study and discusses the implications. 
2. The quality of government institutions and entrepreneurship 
Recent developments in economics have led to very interesting formal models of entrepreneurship 
(Audretsch and Thurik 2001; Audretsch 2007). For instance, in their approach Reynolds et al. 
(1999) suggest that established business activity at the national level varies along with the variables 
denominated to “general national framework conditions”, while early-stage entrepreneurial activity 
varies with the “entrepreneurial framework conditions”. These conditions are related to the social, 
cultural and political context of a country, and being entrepreneurship specific they comprise 
policies and governmental programs aimed at enabling and fostering entrepreneurship.  
Individuals’ perceptions on the feasibility of engaging in entrepreneurial activity and its incentives 
and restrictions are related to the surrounding institutions (Veciana and Urbano 2008). As they 
comprise the governance structures built on rules, norms, values and cultural meanings, they 
influence human behavior within a country (North 1990) and reduce the related uncertainty in a 
society (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) Accordingly, previous research suggests the existence of the 
relationship between institutional factors, such as government regulations, availability of necessary 
resources, and public policies, and entrepreneurship at the individual and national level (Eckhardt 
and Ciuchta 2008; Hessels et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2004; Verheul et al. 2002; Stenholm et al. 2013). 
Government institutions’ role in affecting the prevalence of different types of entrepreneurship is 
vital. There is a increasing stream of literature examining the role of specific policies on 
entrepreneurship (Audretsch et al. 2007; Hoffmann 2007; Stevenson and Lundström 2005, 2007) 
indicating that by introducing policies that promote entrepreneurship as well as by creating a 
general institutional structure favorable to entrepreneurship government institutions can shape the 
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entrepreneurial dynamics of a country or region (Sobel et al. 2007). In general the prevalence of 
entrepreneurial opportunities tends to increase with less regulation and fewer barriers to entry (El-
Namaki 1988). 
The efficient allocation of resources in an economy––in this case, the allocation of entrepreneurial 
talent between different types of entrepreneurial activity––is expected to be attributable to the 
institutional structures. Institutions—the basic set of constraints and enablers within which 
economic agents interact—have a crucial role in a society and in an economy. As an analogy: 
consider economic interaction as a game; it becomes quite evident that the rules of the game can 
shape, in a crucial sense, the outcome of the interaction (Buchanan 1991). Alternative structures of 
the rules can then be expected to lead to different outcomes. For instance, regulatory processes 
promote or hinder entrepreneurship by shaping the level of risk involved in the formation and start 
of a business, and entrepreneurial behavior is influenced by the rules adopted and their enforcement 
(Baumol and Strom 2007). In this study we focus solely on regulative institutions and their quality, 
since the quality of regulative institutions––the transparency of institutions, low levels of 
corruption, and the protection of property rights––positively influence economic development 
(Knack and Keefer 1995; Rodrik 2000).  
Even if the basic principles of neoclassical economic theory suggest that entrepreneurship must be 
commenced from an individualistic perspective (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979; Bianchi and 
Henrekson 2005), the institutions do matter. Institutions affect to the calculations based on which 
the economic agent decides whether or not to undertake entrepreneurial activities or any other type 
of wage earning activities. It is the individual’s rationale that determines the allocation of inputs 
across different activities when he or she is faced with a given economic constraint or a given 
environmental opportunity. Then, a model of labor choice can explain entrepreneurship (Lucas 
1978; Lazear 2005).  Risk aversion also plays a role in this decision-making; agents are less likely 
to be entrepreneurs when good, less risky alternatives for a job are available (Iyigun and Owen 
1998). Additionally, previous research suggests that engagement in entrepreneurship increases 
when the opportunity and transaction costs related to entrepreneurship decrease (McMullen et al. 
2008). These aspects highlight the critical role of the quality of institutions in determining human 
behavior. For instance, it is well known that if “prices” do not convey accurate information as to the 
relative scarcities of different ‘products’ (Hayek 1945), then the allocation of resources will be 
misguided. It is evident that this dilemma should be extended to cover the allocation of 
entrepreneurial effort (or, more generally, the allocation of labor). At the same time, risk 
perceptions and assessments can also be affected by the institutional quality. An economy where the 
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otherwise prevalent institutional framework does not safeguard an agent’s economic freedom tends 
to be riskier in an objective sense1. This affects once again the manner in which the economy 
resolves its resource allocation problem. These examples represent particularly illustrative instances 
in which institutional quality dramatically influences the determinants of entrepreneurship. 
Accordingly, we assume that quality of institutions has influence on entrepreneurs who engage in 
entrepreneurship due to necessity looking for earnings. For instance, freedom from high tax rates 
and price controls seem to enhance necessity-based entrepreneurship (McMullen et al. 2008). Thus, 
in case of necessity-based entrepreneurship we assume that the individual has to face the quality of 
institutions (whatever it might be) and find a way to succeed in entrepreneurial behavior. However, 
if the quality of institutions is favorable for entrepreneurship, fewer individuals will engage in 
necessity-based entrepreneurship. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H1:  The quality of institutions has a negative influence on necessity-based 
entrepreneurship 
There is a general consensus that countries with weak institutional quality could have difficulties in 
enhancing their economic development after controlling for several variables like social, political 
and geography aspects (Basu and Das 2010). For less developed countries it is necessary to 
strengthen their entrepreneurial framework conditions in order to attain more entrepreneurial 
activity (Acs, 2006). Paraphrasing Bardhan’s (2005) question, “Institutions matter, but which 
ones?” we propose “Institutions matters, but is it equal?” to put emphasis on the interaction between 
the quality of institutions and different stages of economic development. Baumol (1990) highlights 
the fact that institutional quality has important effects on the allocation of entrepreneurial talent in a 
given economy: the different types of entrepreneurial activity are partially due to the economic and 
political institutions and what kind of incentives they create for enterprising individuals. Baumol’s 
(1990) conjectures explain that countries (or regions) with better institutions have more productive 
entrepreneurship and less unproductive (or destructive) entrepreneurship. When the incentive 
structure of an economy leads agents to unproductive (rent seeking) activities, we can expect that 
agents will follow suit. For example, in a world where the largest “prizes” are awarded to those that 
undertake unproductive activities, the level of productive entrepreneurship will necessarily be 
smaller. Boettke and Coyne (2003) have observed that entrepreneurship manifests itself differently 
across alternative institutional regimes and that only some of these expressions are consistent with 
                                                
1 This greater risk can be captured by examining the assessments of risk-rating agencies, as well as from the point of 
view of modern portfolio financial theory in terms of the higher returns demanded by the investors in these 
economies. 
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economic development. From an aggregate point of view previous work tends to validate that 
institutional quality has an important effect on economic outcomes (Barro 1991; Knack and Keefer 
1995, 1997). In less developed countries the emphasis of public policies is more on general 
development of institutions, necessary infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and primary 
education (Bosma and Levie 2010) than in economic development. The related results suggest that 
in less developed countries the relationship between necessity-based entrepreneurship and economic 
development is negative (Acs et al. 2008). In all, a higher level of economic development seems to 
benefit more opportunity-based than necessity-based entrepreneurship (Acs 2006; Acs and Varga 
2005). Even if the actual appearance of necessity-based entrepreneurs varies––from only option to 
get income to one’s employer pushes someone to start their own business––across the stages of 
economic development (Williams 2009), the above highlights the importance of assessing the role 
of institutional quality on entrepreneurial activity across different levels of economic development. 
In this sense, if institutional variables are different depending on the country’s degree of 
development, does this situation affect the types of entrepreneurship in a different manner? 
Accordingly, we assume that in developed countries the quality of institutions has a positive 
influence on necessity-based entrepreneurship. On the contrary, based on the statements presented 
above we assume that in less developed countries the quality of institutions has also a positive 
influence on necessity-based entrepreneurship. Thus, we hypothesize that  
H2:  The relationship between the quality of institutions and necessity-based 
entrepreneurship is positively moderated by country’s level of economic 
development 
3. Empirical model 
3.1 Data sources 
We use two data sources to test our hypotheses. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
project comprises harmonized, internationally comparable data to evaluate entrepreneurship activity 
across different countries among adult working age (18–64-years old) population. We employ data 
from the GEM study for the years 2001 to 2011. The sample covers 89 economies, although there is 
substantial variation in data availability, with several countries having only one or two years worth 
of data. Countries with richer data are those who started to collect GEM data earlier, with most 
being developed countries. Overall, 460 individual country-year observations are available, but the 
resulting panel is somewhat unbalanced. Of the 89 economies, 61 are considered developing 
economies, and these provide 49% of all observations.  
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The GEM data contains various entrepreneurial indicators that have been constructed on the basis of 
a survey known as the adult population survey, APS. GEM data provides estimates of the 
percentage of the adult population who are actively involved in starting a new venture. This 
indicator is called the early stage entrepreneurial activity index2. Our focus is one of its motivational 
derivations: necessity- and opportunity-based early stage entrepreneurial activity. We focus on the 
category which involves individuals engaging in necessity-based entrepreneurial activity (NEC). 
They are “pushed” into entrepreneurship because being an entrepreneur is the only option for 
wealth generation. Although many studies recognize that the majority of entrepreneurial activity is 
the result of the search for business opportunities (Kolvereid 1996; Feldman and Bolino 2000; 
Carter et al. 2003; Hessels et al. 2008; Bosma et al. 2008), there is a relatively high prevalence of 
NEC entrepreneurs starting new endeavors in many low and middle-income countries. Table 1 
provides a list of countries with GEM data averages, number of observations and their classification 
in terms of economic development. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Data on the quality of institutions were gathered from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) database3. The background of this database is grounded in the recognition that 
‘governance matters’ (Kaufmann et al. 1999; Kaufmann et al. 2008) and its definition explains the 
assumptions through which the effects of governance are expected to make a difference on 
economic outcomes. The governance is defined “as the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised for the common good”. This definition is parallel with North’s 
(1990) largely acknowledged definition of institutions. WGI comprises aggregate and individual 
governance indicators for 215 countries and territories covering the period 1996–2011. The WGI 
covers six dimensions of governance: Voice and accountability, Political stability and absence of 
violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption.  
                                                
2 This index is based on the life-cycle of the entrepreneurial process which is divided into two periods: the first covers 
nascent entrepreneurs who have undertaken some action to create a new business in the past year but have not paid 
any salaries or wages in the last three months. The second category includes owners/managers of businesses that have 
paid wages and salaries for over three months, but less than 42 months. (Bosma et al. 2008) 
3 For the complete more information see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
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3.2 Dependent variables 
In testing the hypotheses we use a dependent variable retrieved from the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM). Both are related to the prevalence of the specific type of entrepreneurial activity 
among the adult (18–64) population across participating countries.  
Necessity-based entrepreneurship. The second dependent variable is the rate of necessity-based 
entrepreneurs (NEC). This rate covers the percentage of the country’s adult population involved in 
entrepreneurship “because they cannot find appropriate employment as paid-labor and thus 
creating a new business is their best available option” (Reynolds et al. 2005: 217). This measure is 
relevant in analyzing the differences in entrepreneurship activity between less developed and 
developed countries.  
3.3 Independent Variables 
In assessing the impact of the quality of institutions, we borrow the set of measurements from the 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project (Kaufman et al. 2009). The 
six variables measured are: 
i) Voice and accountability, measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
ii) Political stability and absence of violence, measuring perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically motivated violence and terrorism. 
iii) Government effectiveness, measuring perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. 
iv) Regulatory quality, measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
 10 
v) Rule of law, measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
vi) Control of corruption, measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. 
Clearly, some of these variables are related more directly with entrepreneurship activities  but all 
variables are considered for the initial analysis. These indicators are measured following a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. According to WGI, 
these variables virtually have scores between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to 
better outcomes. The WGI indicators are available biannually from 1996, and annually for the 
period 2002–2011. Values for 2001 have been imputed and extrapolated, respectively4.  
In addition to the quality of insitutions measures, we study the role of economic development in the 
relationship between entrepreneurial motives and institutional quality. This was assessed by using a 
dichotomical variable for the whether the country shows a high level of income and development 
(Developed Country=1) as an independent variable. This item enables to assess nonlinearities or 
discontinuities in the way institutions affect entrepreneurial activity. 
Control variables. The analyses were controlled for several variables. Macroeconomic indicators 
such as GDP per capita, inflation rates (examined but later excluded due to multicollinearity) and 
real GDP growth have been acquired from the IMF´s International Financial Statistics dataset5. Per 
capita income growth rate is a good proxy for measuring economic growth and is one of main 
sources for qualifying the economic environment (Wennekers et al. 2005). GDP per capita is 
adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP) in international US dollars.  
An important issue that affects the precision of econometric results is the high correlation that exists 
among the different measures of institutional quality. On the one hand, the different sources of 
indicators readily available on institutions (i.e. WGI, Global Economic Forum´s Global 
                                                
4 Regression results are robust to dropping observations in this year. To allow inclusion of a larger set of countries, we 
have preferred to show results using imputed data. All results have used linear trends or lagged data, when the former 
is unavailable.  
5  Some indicators from Iran, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, West Bank and Gaza Strip were obtained from The CIA World 
Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/,  
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Competitiveness Index or Heritage Foundation´s Economic Freedom Index) will be very coincident 
as they measure similar aspects of the business environment. This is solved by refraining from 
combining institutional quality indicators from more than one source of data. On the other hand and 
more pervasively, indicators from the same source will also be highly correlated among themselves, 
as the aspects they measure are intimately related. Table 2 shows correlation across indicators of 
institutional quality and GDP per capita on the selected sample of economies.  
 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Such high correlation among indicators would lead to some collinearity and imprecisely estimated 
coefficients if all were to be included in regression analysis. A reliability analysis of the WGI data 
using the 460 observations show a Cronbach´s Alpha=0.97. Thus, principal component analysis 
(PCA) is performed over this set of indicators to reduce data to a suitable number of dimensions. 
One single factor is extracted from the principal component analysis that explains 87.5% of the total 
variance6. By consequence we can reduce in one component the WGI indicators and calculate a 
new variable named Governance Index. The higher the value of the Governance Index is the better 
is the quality of institutions in a country. Table 3 shows the related component matrix.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
3.4 Methodology 
The sections on the literature framework and GEM descriptions on Table 1 note that the developing 
countries have relatively high rates of necessity-based entrepreneurial dynamics, while most 
developed nations have relatively high rates of opportunity-based entrepreneurs. Mindful of the 
general research proposition, in countries under ceteris paribus conditions7, the relationship 
between the institutional quality variables is positive for the opportunity entrepreneurial dynamics 
                                                
6  KMO= 0.928 and Bartlett's test p<0.001 (Approx. Chi-Square 4423.79; d.f.=15) indicate that PCA fits the data well. 
7  Obviously other different economic, demographic, social and institutional factors exist, which influence 
entrepreneurial activity. See Wennekers et al. (2005: 298). 
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rates, and negative for necessity entrepreneurship. In order to examine these relationships, we use a 
series of regressions following the general specification: 
Eit= f(GIit; DCit; Xit)  
where:  
E is the entrepreneurial dynamics measurement, NEC; 
GI represents principal components scores of WGI dataset or Governance Index; 
DC represents a dummy variable for developed countries. 
X is a set of control variables, including GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted), GDP growth. 
i is the country index and t is the time period. 
Models are estimated by pooling the cross-section of countries with the available time series data on 
each country for the period 2001–2011. Several models will be reviewed, increasing the number of 
control variables and examining interaction effects8. Also, several econometric specifications will 
be tested. 
4. Results 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the used variables. In testing the hypotheses we ran first 
pooled OLS regressions which were adjusted for the year of observation. OLS models do not 
provide completely efficient estimators but gives some insights as to the nature of the relationships 
among variables. Next we ran panel models. We select random-effects models because they were 
proven to be more consistent9.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
                                                
8 We make two interaction effects with the governance index: one with the developed country dummy; the second with 
GDP. 
9  Hausman test for OPP chi2 = 5.75, Prob>chi2 = 0.124 for NEC chi2=9.92, Prob>chi2 =0.537. We assumed than 
random effects is consistent and efficient under the H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
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Table 5 shows the models related to the regressions results for necessity-based entrepreneurship 
(NEC). All the model estimations except model 4 (by collinearity problem that we will discuss 
later) indicate that Governance Index influences negatively NEC (p<0.01). The results of random 
effects consistent models support our hypothesis H1 proposing that the quality of institutions has 
negative influence on necessity-based entrepreneurship. Thus, a better working set of institutions 
reduces the propensity at country-level of necessity-based entrepreneurs. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
In testing the hypothesis H2 we investigated the interaction between the governance index and 
country’s stage of economic development. Developed Country variable and GDP are high-
correlated and cause multicolinearity problems when both are introduced at the same time (i.e. 
Model 4). For this reason we tested two interactions between Governance Index one with 
Developed Country and one with GDP (i.e. Models 6 and 8). In terms of necessity-based 
entrepreneurship, the results of the model 8 suggest a positive interaction effect between the 
economic development and the Governance Index (p<0.05). Accordingly, our hypothesis H2 is 
supported. Since the initial effects of both items (included in the interaction) on NEC are negative, 
the positive interaction illustrates that the negative effects are enhanced when the level of economic 
development improves. This suggests that the improvements in institutional quality have a negative 
effect on the prevalence of necessity-based entrepreneurial activities (reduce the propensity of 
population to be involved on NEC activities), particularly in developing countries where self-
employment is a forced option on many people. Figure 1 shows the interaction effects for NEC 
model. The results show that in less developed countries the less opportune institutional governance 
increases the prevalence of NEC. If, however, the institutional governance improves, the prevalence 
of NEC decreases. Similarly, the results illustrate how in developed countries the prevalence of 
NEC is not remarkably affected by the quality of institutions. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
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5.  Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed the less addressed the relationship between the quality of institutions and 
the necessity-based entrepreneurship. By doing so, our results illustrate that the quality of 
institutions actually matters in entrepreneurship, but this mechanism contains some variation. Our 
findings suggest that necessity-based entrepreneurship is bound to the institutional quality. Thus, 
our work adds to the empirical evidence on the importance of institutional context in the level, 
motivations and quality of new venture creation across countries (Sobel et al. 2007; Bowen and De 
Clercq 2008; Bjørnskov and Foss 2008) following Baumol’s (1990) propositions of the allocation 
of entrepreneurial activity. As Boettke and Coyne (2006) state, institutions can be understood as the 
formal and informal rules regulating human behavior and the enforcement of these rules. 
Entrepreneurship is the outcome of human behavior and the institutional environment—in this case 
its quality—will either enhance or hamper entrepreneurial activities. In this study we provide the 
analysis of the effect of economic development in the relationship between the quality of 
institutions and types of entrepreneurship. This aspect enabled us to study how the initial 
associations affecting types of entrepreneurship vary in relation to economic development. 
Interestingly, our findings underscore that differences in institutional quality help to explain 
differences in entrepreneurship across developed and developing countries.  
Our findings on necessity-based entrepreneurship activities have important implications for 
developing countries. The negative relationship between necessity-based entrepreneurship and the 
governance index confirms the influence of institutional quality on the allocation of 
entrepreneurship efforts. Drawing from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s methodology necessity-
driven entrepreneurs can be dictated both by pull and push factors (Williams 2009). The latter 
situation is very common in developing economies. On the other hand, some necessity 
entrepreneurs could be relevant for many economies because in many cases, despite the particularly 
small scale of the business, they can still be productive. Thus, necessity entrepreneurs are not 
necessarily less successful (Block and Sandner 2009) and not all opportunity-based entrepreneurs 
create successful business with high impact on job creation and economic growth. 
Interestingly, our main finding illustrates that in less developed countries the less opportune 
institutional governance increases the prevalence of necessity-based entrepreneurship. If, however, 
the institutional governance improves, the engagement in necessity-based entrepreneurship 
decreases. This very mechanism highlights the importance of the quality of institutions in the 
allocation of entrepreneurial effort across countries. Further, our results show how in developed 
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countries the prevalence of necessity-based entrepreneurship is no longer remarkably affected by 
the quality of institutions. In general terms our results indicate that more economic development 
associated with the better quality of institutions reduce the prevalence rates of necessity-based 
entrepreneurship some of which is shaped by unproductive and non-innovative new business. 
(Anoknin and Wincent 2011; Shane 2009). For public policy, Leibenstein (1968: 83) suggests that 
attention be focused on: ‘…the gaps, obstructions, and impediments in the market network of the 
economy in question and on the gap filling and input completing capacities and responsiveness to 
different motivational states of the potential entrepreneurs in the population’. In this sense, the 
government institutions should converge to enhance the efficiency of the market, as well as to 
provide a general, opportune environment that is open to motivated entrepreneurs (Levie and Autio 
2008). In developing countries, the institutional environment is usually embedded with the lack of 
regulations and rule of law (de Soto 2000), so many entrepreneurial efforts lead to large scale, 
predominantly unproductive activities rather than the more desirable productive activities. Thus, the 
institutional profiles in developing countries contrast with those of the high income developed 
economies that benefit from a sound regulatory base and well-established support for 
entrepreneurship (Manolova et al. 2008). 
Our findings have important implications for public policy. The results suggest that for developing 
countries in general, the quality of institutions alone does not enhance or improve entrepreneurship 
but it strongly affects the type of entrepreneurial activity in a country. This implies continuing 
efforts for the reduction of unemployment and necessity-based entrepreneurship. But this kind of 
public policy, although indispensable, is insufficient. If developing countries do not consider the 
promotion of productive entrepreneurship as a main concern in their policy agenda (Wennekers et 
al. 2005), they will only reduce necessity-based entrepreneurship without achieving higher growth 
through opportunity-based entrepreneurship. Such governmental decisions require the creation of 
better national strategies to accelerate country growth and move more rapidly toward major 
innovation-based entrepreneurial activities (Acs and Amorós 2008). With an adequate environment, 
including the quality of institutions, entrepreneurship can help to improve the economic and social 
conditions for developing economies.  
 
Even this paper suggests new avenues for future research on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and institutions––specifically the quality of governmental institutions––our 
results are, in some sense, exploratory and more work is needed in this area. We recognize a series 
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of limitations many of which create opportunities for future research. First, the models of the 
present research could comprise other entrepreneurship and institutional variables. For example 
variables including formal registration of new firms versus informal sectors could be interesting to 
test with other type of institutional proxies. Second, if the longitudinal approach we used with panel 
data is novel, our approach was, however, embedded with assumption of linear relationships. 
Instead, the use of different specifications, such as non-linear and other sophisticated formulations, 
may produce varying results. Third, our research focused solely on country-level analysis which 
considers many relevant aspects known at this level. Unfortunately, at the same time our approach 
excluded some relevant aspects generated by the heterogeneity within countries and how national 
institutions might regionally shape different types of entrepreneurship. Accordingly, future research 
could include technics like multilevel analysis in order to assess related individual-level and 
regional level relationships between institutions and different types of entrepreneurship. Finally, we 
categorized economies into two groups. However, this aggregation could also be expanded to cover 
various stage of economic development. Thus, some economies could be classified based on 
different criteria which would enable deeper insights on the role of institutional quality in shaping 
entrepreneurship in different economies.  
In conclusion, our findings illustrate that the quality of institutions has an influence on necessity-
based entrepreneurial activity. Our findings also emphasize how does the level of economic 
developed moderate this influence. Given that at the country level the type of entrepreneurial 
engagement faces constant uncertainty, environmental change, and competitive forces, the quality 
of institutions seems to be particularly important in enhancing entrepreneurial activities in a country 
and later on the possible transformation from necessity-based entrepreneurship to opportunity-based 
entrepreneurship. 
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Table 1: GEM Countries 2001-2011 
 
Observations count 
 
 
Developing Develop NEC (average) 
Algeria 2 - 3.23 
Angola 2 - 9.7 
Argentina 11 - 5.35 
Australia - 8 2.46 
Austria - 2 -.45 
Bangladesh 1 - 3.49 
Barbados 1 - -.63 
Belgium - 11 -.49 
Bolivia 2 - 7.55 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
4 - 3.54 
Brazil 11 - 5.54 
Canada - 6 2.03 
Chile 9 - 4.38 
China 8 - 7.26 
Colombia 6 - 8.24 
Costa Rica 1 - 4.28 
Croatia 10 - 2.14 
Czech Republic 2 - 2.25 
Denmark - 11 -.63 
Dominican Republic 3 - 5.71 
Ecuador 4 - 6.08 
Egypt 2 - 3.08 
Finland - 11 1.01 
France - 11 1.07 
Germany - 10 1.49 
Ghana 1 - 12.51 
Greece - 9 1.57 
Guatemala 3 - 4.57 
Hong Kong - 5 1.15 
Hungary 10 - 2.03 
Iceland - 9 -.8 
India 5 - 3.05 
Indonesia 1 - 2.62 
Iran 4 - 4.86 
Ireland - 10 1.97 
Israel - 6 1.38 
Italy - 10 -.96 
Jamaica 6 - 6.07 
Japan - 11 -.85 
Jordan 2 - 2.73 
Kazakhstan 1 - 2.6 
Korea - 6 3.98 
Latvia 7 - 1.88 
Lebanon 1 - 2.66 
Lithuania 1 - 3.2 
Macedonia 2 - 5.72 
Malaysia 4 - -.69 
Mexico 7 - 2.92 
Montenegro 1 - 5.55 
Morocco 1 - 3.99 
Netherlands - 11 -.84 
New Zealand - 5 3.52 
Nigeria 1 - 11.08 
Norway - 11 1.07 
Pakistan 2 - 3.97 
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Panama 2 - 3.93 
Peru 7 - 8.09 
Philippines 1 - 9.32 
Poland 4 - 3.14 
Portugal 5 - 1.57 
Puerto Rico 1 - -.45 
Romania 5 - 1.8 
Russia 8 - 1.32 
Saudi Arabia 2 - -.75 
Serbia 3 - 2.83 
Singapore - 7 1.27 
Slovak Republic - 1 3.91 
Slovenia - 10 -.65 
South Africa 10 - 2.25 
Spain - 11 1.39 
Sweden - 9 -.81 
Switzerland - 7 -.8 
Syria 1 - 3.12 
Taiwan - 3 1.54 
Thailand 5 - 4.91 
Tonga 1 - 5.75 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 - 2.76 
Tunisia 2 - 1.67 
Turkey 5 - 2.61 
Uganda 4 - 14.56 
United Arab Emirates 4 - -.92 
United Kingdom - 11 1.06 
United States - 11 2.27 
Uruguay 6 - 3.13 
Vanuatu 1 - 19.55 
Venezuela 5 - 7.58 
West Bank & Gaza 
Strip 
2 - 3.24 
Yemen 1 - 8.32 
Zambia 1 - 10.49 
TOTAL (averages) 227 233 3.71 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix for GDP and WGI indicators 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Control of corruption  1       
2 Government efficiency  .958** 1      
3 Political stability  and no Violence .841** .818** 1     
4 Rule of law  .965** .959** .835** 1    
5 Regulation quality  .933** .932** .767** .933** 1   
6 Voice & accountability  .867** .853** .783** .887** .826** 1 
 7 GDP per capita PPP  .817** .836** .712** .841** .820** .728** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Source: World Bank and IMF. 
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Table 3:  Principal Component Analysis Matrix from WGI 
 
 Component 
Voice & accountability  0.878 
Control of corruption  0.966 
Government efficiency  0.969 
Political stability  and no violence 0.867 
Rule of law  0.978 
Regulation quality  0.948 
KMO=.928, Barlett’s p<.001  
 
 
 
Table 4:  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the relevant variables 
 
  
Min. Max. Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
            
2 NEC 0.090 19.550 2.800 2.876 0.636 1     
3 Governance Index  -1.780 1.903 0.435 0.977 -0.284 -0.630 1    
4 GDP per capita (PPP)  912.19 59710.29 22588.69 13015.20 -0.341 -0.693 0.834 1   
5 GDP Growth  -18.00 14.20 3.043 3.767 0.263 0.273 -0.300 -0.338 1 
 6  Developed country 0.000 1.000 0.510 0.501 -0.346 -0.622 0.808 0.831 -0.318 1 
All correlations are significant at p<0.05 
Valid N (listwise) 460 
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Table 5:  Regressions results for necessity-based entrepreneurship (NEC) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE 
Governance Index  -1.708 -1.417 -0.843 -0.831 -2.045 -1.537 -1.771 -1.801 
 (0.130)** (0.245)** (0.248)** (0.491) (0.349)** (0.560)** (0.281)** (0.519)** 
GDP per capita (PPP)    -8.53E-02 -8.53E-02 -1.40E-01 -1.46E-01   
    (1.947e-05)** (4.018e-05)* (2.170e-05)** (4.401e-05)**   
GDP Growth   0.085 -0.029 0.048 -0.029 0.080 -0.035 
   (0.042)* (0.025) (0.038) (0.025) (0.041) (0.026) 
Developed country   0.345 -0.024   -1.800 -2.434 
   (0.331) (0.828)   (0.286)** (0.820)** 
Interactions         
Developed x Governance       1.327 1.646 
       (0.309)** (0.708)* 
GDP x Governance     7,68E-02 6,03E-02   
     (1.320e-05)** (2.488e-05)*   
Constant 3.543 3.707 7.081 5.662 7.636 6.108 6.276 4.143 
 (0.148)** (0.296)** (0.580)** (0.904)** (0.623)** (0.909)** (0.544)** (0.478)** 
         
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.45 0.43 0.51 0.49 0.44 0.42 
F 173.52**  22.48**  24.71**  22.84**  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wald Chi2  33.58**  174.57**  149.28**  168.49** 
Prob >Chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations 460 460 460 460 460 460 460 460 
Number of groups  89  89  89  89 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. **Significant at 1%, *Significant at 5%.  Control by year included not reported. 
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Figure 1: Interaction effects of Governance Index and degree of development (country 
level) in terms of necessity-based entrepreneurship 
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